In the last several decades, networked systems have grown in complexity and sophistication, introducing complex interdependencies amongst their numerous and diverse components. Attackers can leverage such interdependencies to penetrate seemingly well-guarded networks through sophisticated multi-step attacks. Research has shown that explicit and implicit interdependencies exist at various layers of the hardware and software architecture. In particular, dependencies between vulnerabilities and dependencies between applications and services are critical for assessing the impact of multi-step attacks. These two classes of interdependencies have been traditionally studied using attack and dependency graphs respectively. Although significant work has been done in the area of both attack and dependency graphs, we demonstrate that neither of these models can provide an accurate assessment of an attack's impact, when used in isolation. To address this limitation, we take a mission-centric approach and present a solution to integrate these two powerful models into a unified framework that enables us to accurately assess the impact of multi-step attacks and identify high-impact attack paths within a network. This analysis can ultimately generate effective hardening recommendations, and can be seen as one phase of a continuous process that iteratively cycles through impact analysis and vulnerability remediation stages.
Introduction
In the last several decades, networked systems have grown in complexity and sophistication, integrating components, services, and applications from a multitude of diverse vendors. This evolution has inevitably introduced complex interdependencies amongst the numerous and diverse components of such interconnected systems. While these technological advancements have brought significant benefits to organizations in terms of automation and process integration, one of the major drawbacks is that attackers can leverage known and unknown vulnerabilities 1 as well as explicit and implicit interdependencies to penetrate seemingly well-guarded networks through sophisticated multi-step attacks. Research has shown that explicit and implicit interdependencies exist at various layers of the hardware and software architecture. In this work, we aim at developing a framework to accurately assess the impact of multi-step attacks and identify effective hardening measures in an iterative process. To this end, two classes of dependencies are of particular interest: dependencies between vulnerabilities and dependencies between applications and services.
Vulnerabilities have pre-and post-conditions. Pre-conditions must be satisfied for an attacker to be able to exploit a vulnerability, and post-conditions become satisfied after the exploit. The key observation here is that the post-conditions of a given exploit may represent the preconditions of another exploit. Therefore, in-depth analysis of network vulnerabilities must consider attacker exploits not merely in isolation, but in combination. Attack graphs reveal such threats by enumerating potential paths that attackers can take to penetrate networks. This helps determine whether a given set of network hardening measures provides safety of given critical resources.
Attack graph analysis can be extended to automatically generate recommendations for hardening networks 2 . One must consider combinations of network conditions to harden, which has corresponding impact on removing paths in the attack graph. Further, one can generate hardening solutions that are optimal with respect to some notion of cost 2 . Such hardening solutions prevent the attack from succeeding, while minimizing the associated costs.
Government or enterprise networks today host a wide variety of applications and services, which often depend on one other. Understanding such dependencies is essential for maintaining the well-being of an enterprise network and its applications, particularly in the presence of network attacks and failures. In a typical enterprise network, which is complex and dynamic in configuration, it is non-trivial to identify all these services and their dependencies. Several techniques have been developed to learn such dependencies automatically. In particular, a suite of novel techniques, named NSDMiner (Mining for Network Service Dependencies), was proposed by Natarajan et al. 3 to automatically discover the dependencies between network services from passively collected network traffic.
Although significant work has been done in the area of both attack and dependency graphs, neither of these models -as demonstrated in Section 4 -can provide an accurate assessment of an attack's impact, when used in isolation. To address this limitation, we take a missioncentric approach and present a solution to integrate these two powerful models into a unified framework that enables us to accurately assess the impact of multi-step attacks and identify high-impact attack paths within a network. This analysis can ultimately generate effective hardening recommendations, and can be seen as one phase of a continuous process that iteratively cycles through impact analysis and vulnerability remediation stages. The proposed solution fits well within the broader field of Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA), which, without loss of generality, can be viewed as a three-phase process: situation perception, situation comprehension, and situation projection 4 . Perception provides information about the status, attributes, and dynamics of relevant elements within the environment. Comprehension of the situation encompasses how people combine, interpret, store, and retain information. Projection of the elements of the environment (situation) into the near future encompasses the ability to make predictions based on the knowledge acquired through perception and comprehension. Ultimately, in order to make informed decisions, security analysts need to be aware of the current situation, the impact and evolution of an attack, the behavior of the attackers, the quality of available information and models, and the plausible futures of the current situation. Some of the questions they may ask are: Is there any ongoing attack? If so, where is the attacker? Are available attack models sufficient to understand what is observed? Can they predict an attacker's goal? If so, how can they prevent that goal from being reached? The proposed model can support all three phases of this process and can help address many of these questions by enabling cyber analysts to (i) map attack steps to the vulnerabilities that are exploited at each step; (ii) identify the systems or services that are directly impacted by such exploits; and (iii) analyze how the effect of an exploit propagates to other connected systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 presents the technical background of our work and important definitions. Then, Section 4 defines the problem we are targeting in our work, and Section 5 presents the proposed impact assessment model. Finally, Section 6 discusses potential applications of our model, and Section 7 gives some concluding remarks.
Related Work
To reconstruct attack scenarios from isolated alerts, some correlation techniques employ prior knowledge about attack strategies 5 or alert dependencies 6 . Other techniques aggregate alerts with similar attributes 7 or statistical patterns 8 . To the best of our knowledge, the limitation of the nested-loop approach 9 , especially for correlating intensive alerts in high-speed networks, has not been addressed. Noel et al. 10 adopt a vulnerability-centric approach to alert correlation, because it can effectively filter out bogus alerts, but the nested loop procedure is still used. Attack scenarios broken by missed alerts are reassembled by clustering alerts with similar attributes 11 . With respect to the general problem of modeling activities, Hidden Markov Models and their variants have been used extensively. For instance, Duong et al. 12 introduce the Switching Hidden Semi-Markov Model, a two-layered extension of the Hidden Semi-Markov Model. Dynamic Bayesian Networks 13 and probabilistic extensions of Petri Nets 14 have also been used for tracking and recognizing multi-agent activities. A survey of temporal concepts and data models used in unsupervised pattern mining from symbolic temporal data is presented by Morchen 15 . In the last decade, there has also been extensive research in Data Stream Management Systems 16 , which may be relevant to the problem of correlating a flow of alerts to nodes of an attack graph.
In large enterprise networks, the performance of an application may depend on many hosts and network components. Recently, automated discovery of dependencies from network traffic 17, 18 has been proposed and several techniques have been developed. Chen et al. 19 presented a comprehensive study of the performance and limitations of this class of dependency discovery techniques, and introduced a new system, Orion, that discovers dependencies using packet headers and timing information in network traffic. A suite of novel techniques, named NSDMiner (Mining for Network Service Dependencies), was proposed by Natarajan et al. 3 to automatically discover the dependencies between network services from passively collected network traffic. NSDMiner is non-intrusive and it does not require any modification of existing software, or injection of network packets. More importantly, NSDMiner achieves higher accuracy than previous network-based approaches.
In summary, the capability of accurately modeling different classes of dependencies in complex networks and assessing the impact of multi-step attack is critical for a number of applications, including mission-centric operations 20 .
Background and Definitions
In this section, we provide key definitions about attack and dependency graphs. The analysis leading to the generation of these two classes of graphs represents the groundwork that enables our integrated model. Throughout the paper, we will be referring to the example depicted in Figure 1 , which illustrates the network architecture of an online retailer. The network consists of three subnetworks separated by firewalls. Two of the three subnetworks offer internet-facing services, namely Online Shopping and Mobile Order Tracking. The first service is implemented on a web server (h A ) paired with a local DB server (h B ), whereas the second service is implemented through a mobile app server (h C ) paired with a local DB server (h D ). Finally, the internal logic of the entire system is implemented in a subnetwork consisting of two servers running core applications (h E and h F ) and a central DB server (h G ), which maintains information about products, customers, and orders. The two local DB servers act as a local cache for the their respective networks. Ideally, an attacker's objective in this scenario is that of breaching the central database server and exfiltrating sensitive financial data.
In our analysis, we start from modeling the topology of the network, known vulnerabilities, possible zero-day vulnerabilities -these must be hypothesized -and their interdependencies. Vulnerabilities are often interdependent, making traditional point-wise vulnerability analysis ineffective. Our topological approach to vulnerability analysis allows to generate accurate attack graphs showing all the possible attack paths within the network. A node in an attack graph represents -depending on the level of abstraction -an exploitable vulnerability (or family of exploitable vulnerabilities) in either a subnet, an individual host, or an individual software application. Edges represent causal relationships between vulnerabilities.
We then perform dependency analysis to discover dependencies among services and/or hosts and derive dependency graphs encoding how these components depend on one another. Dependency analysis is critical to assess the current impact resulting from ongoing attacks (i.e., the value or utility of services disrupted by the attacks) and future impact (i.e., the value or utility of additional services that will be disrupted if no action is taken). In fact, in a complex enterprise, many services may rely on the availability of other services or resources. Therefore, Figure 1 . Sample network architecture of an online retailer they may be indirectly affected by the compromise of the services or resources they rely upon.
Finally, we integrate these two models into a multilayer model that we call impact assessment graph, as detailed in Section 5.
Topological Vulnerability Analysis
Situational awareness, as defined in the previous sections, implies knowledge and understanding of both the defender (knowledge of us) and the attacker (knowledge of them). In turn, this implies knowledge and understanding of all the weaknesses existing in the computing infrastructure we aim to defend. By their very nature, security concerns on networks are highly interdependent. Each host's susceptibility to attack depends on the vulnerabilities of other hosts in the network. Attackers can combine vulnerabilities in unexpected ways, allowing them to incrementally penetrate a network and compromise critical systems. To protect our critical infrastructure networks, we must understand not only individual system vulnerabilities, but also their interdependencies. While we cannot predict the origin and timing of attacks, we can reduce their impact by knowing the possible attack paths through our networks. To this end, we cannot rely on manual processes and mental models. Instead, we need automated tools to analyze and visualize vulnerability dependencies and attack paths, so we can understand our overall security posture, providing context over the full security life cycle.
A viable approach to such full-context security is called Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA) 21 . TVA monitors the state of network assets, maintains models of network vulnerabilities and residual risk, and combines these to produce models that convey the impact of individual and combined vulnerabilities on the overall security posture. The core element of this tool is an attack graph showing all possible ways an attacker can penetrate the network. Topological vulnerability analysis looks at vulnerabilities and their protective measures within the context of overall network security by modeling their interdependencies via attack graphs. This approach provides a unique new capability, transforming raw security data into a roadmap that lets one proactively prepare for attacks, manage vulnerability risks, and have real-time situational awareness. It supports both offensive (e.g., penetration testing) and defensive (e.g., network hardening) applications. The mapping of attack paths through a network via TVA provides a concrete understanding of how individual and combined vulnerabilities impact overall network security. For example, we can (i) determine whether risk-mitigating efforts have a significant impact on overall security; (ii) determine how much a new vulnerability will impact overall security; and (iii) analyze how changes to individual hosts may increase overall risk to the enterprise.
This approach has been implemented as a security tool -called Cauldron 22 and commercially available -which transforms raw security data into a model of all possible network attack paths. The development of this tool has addressed several technical challenges, including the design of appropriate models, efficient model population, effective visualization and decision support tools, and the development of scalable mathematical representations and algorithms. The result is a working software tool that offers truly unique capabilities.
Attack Graphs
The first step in achieving the objective of effectively assessing the impact of multi-step attacks is to to develop the capability of modeling cyber attacks and their consequences. This capability is critical to support many of the additional capabilities needed to address the key questions that cyber analysts may need to answer in the process of gaining cyber situational awareness.
Attack graphs represent prior knowledge about vulnerabilities, their dependencies, and network connectivity. Different representations are possible for an attack graph. First, an attack graph can explicitly enumerate all possible sequences of vulnerabilities an attacker can exploit to reach a target, i.e., all possible attack paths. However, such graphs face a combinatorial explosion in the number of attack paths. Second, with a monotonicity assumption stating an attacker never relinquishes obtained capabilities, an attack graph can record the dependencies among vulnerabilities and keep attack paths implicitly without losing any information. The resulting attack graph has no duplicate vertices and hence has a polynomial size in the number of vulnerabilities multiplied by the number of connected pairs of hosts.
In this paper, we start from the definition of attack graph presented by Wang et al.
9
, which assumes the latter notion of attack graphs. Definition 1. Attack graph. Given a set of vulnerability exploits V, a set of security conditions C, a require relation R r ⊆ C × V , and an imply relation R i ⊆ V × C, an attack graph G is the directed graph G = (V ∪ C, R r ∪ R i ), where V ∪ C is the vertex set and R r ∪ R i the edge set.
We denote an exploit as a predicate v(h s , h d ), indicating an exploitation of vulnerability v on the destination host h d , initiated from the source host h s . Similarly, we write v(h) for exploits involving only local host h.
A security condition is a predicate c(h s , h d ) that indicates a satisfied security-related condition c involving the source host h s and the destination host h d (when a condition involves a single host, we simply write c(h)).
Examples of security conditions include the existence of a vulnerability on a given host or the connectivity between two hosts. Initial conditions are a special subset of security conditions, as defined below 23 . Definition 2. Initial conditions. Given an attack graph G = (V ∪ C, R r ∪ R i ), initial conditions refer to the subset of conditions C i = fc ∈ C j 9 = v ∈ V s.t. (v, c) ∈ R i g, whereas intermediate conditions refer to the subset C\C i .
Intermediate conditions are usually consequences of exploits and hence cannot be disabled without removing their causes. Instead, initial conditions are not created through the execution of exploits, thus they might be removed. Usually, only initial conditions that can be disabled are explicitly modeled, whereas initial conditions that network administrators cannot control, such as privileges on the attacker's machine, are omitted. Figure 2 depicts an example of attack graph for a network including three hosts -denoted as host 0, 1, and 2 respectively -with exploits appearing as rectangles and conditions as ovals. Purple ovals represent initial conditions, whereas blue ovals represent intermediate conditions. Some modeling simplifications have been made, such as combining transport-layer ftp connectivity between two hosts h s and h d , physical-layer connectivity, and the existence of the ftp daemon on host h d into a single condition ftp(h s ,h d ). In this example, we assume that the attacker's objective is to reach condition root(2), i.e., gaining root privileges on host 2. As an example of attack path, the attacker can first establish a trust relationship from his machine (host 0) to host 2 (condition trust(2, 0)) via the exploit ftp_rhosts(0,2) on host 2, then gain user privileges on host 2 (condition user (2)) with an rsh login (exploit rsh(0, 2)), and finally achieve the goal condition root(2) using a local buffer overflow attack on host 2 (exploit local_bof (2)).
The analysis of attack graphs can provide alternative sets of protective measures that guarantee safety of critical systems. For instance, in the example of Figure 2 , one could prevent the attacker from reaching the target security condition root(2) by disabling one of the following two sets of initial conditions: {ftp(0,2), ftp(1,2)}, or { ftp(0,2), ftp(0,1), sshd(0,1)}.
Through this unique new capability, administrators are able to determine the best sets of protective measures that should be applied in their environment. In fact, each set of protective measures may have a different cost or impact, and administrators can choose the best option with respect to any of these variables.
Although the one presented above is one of the most commonly adopted definitions of attack graph, various alternative definitions exist. As our work primarily focuses on impact assessment -where vulnerability exploits play a central role -we adopt a more compact representation of attack graphs that only include vulnerabilities and edges amongst them, leaving security conditions implicit. Such graph can be referred to as the vulnerability dependency graph, as it explicitly models dependencies amongst vulnerabilities.
Definition 3. Vulnerability dependency graph. Given a set of vulnerability exploits V, a set of security conditions C, a require relation R r ⊆ C × V , and an imply relation
The definition above, in the interest of highlighting the key difference between the two attack graph representations, omits to model the relationship between an exploit and its predecessor nodes. As each precondition of a vulnerability must be satisfied for the vulnerability to be exploited, and each such condition requires that at least one of the exploits for which it is a post-condition is satisfied, such relationship is a conjunction of disjunctions. This notion is captured by Definition 5 in the next section. Figure 3 depicts the vulnerability dependency graph corresponding to the attack graph of Figure 2 . In this representation, the security conditions are implicit in the edges connecting the vulnerabilities. An edge from a vulnerability v i to a vulnerability v j indicates that exploiting v i creates some of the preconditions for exploiting v j . Similarly, Figure 4 depicts a partial vulnerability dependency graph for the network of Figure 1 . Figure 5 shows a more compact representation for the graph of Figure 4 . As done in Cauldron 22 , this representation collapses multiple vulnerability exploits on the same machine into a single node and labels each edge (h i , h j ) with the number of vulnerabilities that can be exploited on h j after exploiting a vulnerability on h i . For instance, the end node of this graph denotes the fact that two vulnerabilities -v 0 G and v 00 G respectively -exist on host h G , and they can both potentially enable the attacker to compromise that host. The edge from v D to the end node denotes the fact that, once the attacker has exploited v D , he can reach host h G exploiting two different vulnerabilities.
In the following, for the sake of conciseness, we will often use the term attack graph to refer to vulnerability dependency graphs, unless otherwise specified.
Probabilistic
To address this limitation, the attack graph model discussed earlier has been extended with the notion of timespan distribution, which encodes probabilistic knowledge of the attacker's behavior as well as temporal constraints Figure 2 on the unfolding of attacks 24 . We assume that each step of an attack sequence is completed within certain temporal windows after the previous exploit has been executed, each associated with a probability. For instance, suppose an attacker has gained some privileges on host h E in Figure 1 . Using these privileges, he can then create the conditions to exploit a vulnerability on the main database server. However, this will take a variable amount of time depending on his skill level and other factors. The attacker will then have time to exploit the vulnerability until the vulnerability itself is patched, or the attack is discovered.
Leversage and Byres 25 describe how to estimate the mean time to compromise a system and relate this variable to the skill level of the attacker. This approach can be generalized to estimate timespan distributions for individual vulnerability exploits. In fact, we can assume that the time taken to exploit a vulnerability varies with the skill level of the attacker. Additionally, some vulnerabilities are easier to exploit than others, thus exhibiting higher probabilities. We can assume that timespan distributions are given, as a detailed discussion about how to derive them is beyond the scope of this paper. The definitions of timespan distribution and probabilistic temporal attack graph, as introduced by Albanese et al.
25
, are given below. • I is a set of time intervals * s.t. 8½x, y ∈ I, x ≤ y; • 8½x, y, ½x 0 , y 0 ∈ I s.t. ½x, y 6 ¼ ½x 0 , y 0 , intervals ½x, y and ½x 0 , y 0 are disjoint; • ρ : I → ½0, 1 is a function that associates a value ρ(x, y) ∈ ½0, 1 with each time interval ½x, y ∈ I. h
We use to denote the set all timespan distributions. Given a timespan distribution ω = (I, ρ), we use S(ω) to denote P ½x, y ∈ I ρ(x, y), and ω:t max to denote max ½x, y ∈ I j ρ(x, y) > 0 y, i.e., the maximum time point for which ρ is not 0. We require that S(ω) ≤ 1.
Intuitively, a timespan distribution (I, ρ) specifies a set I of disjoint time intervals when a given exploit might be executed, and an incomplete probability distribution ρ over I: ρ(x, y) is the probability that the exploit will in fact be executed during the time interval ½x, y, following the execution of the previous exploit. ρ is not forced to be complete as the exploit might not be executed at all. Definition 5. Probabilistic Temporal Attack Graph. Given an attack graph G = (V ∪ C, R r ∪ R i ) a probabilistic temporal attack graph built on G is a labeled directed acyclic graph A = (V , E, δ, γ) where:
• V is the finite set of vulnerability exploits in the attack graph;
, there exists at least one start node and one end node; • δ : E → is a function that associates a timespan distribution with each edge in the graph, such that
• γ is a function that associates with each exploit v j ∈ V \V s the condition
where ν i, j denotes that v j must be preceded by v i and must be executed within one of the time intervals defined by δ(v i , v j ), following the execution of v i . h Intuitively, an edge e = (v i , v j ) in a probabilistic temporal attack graph indicates that vulnerability exploit v i prepares for exploit v j . The timespan distribution δ(e) = (I, ρ) labeling the edge indicates how the probability that v j is executed after v i changes with time. The condition γ(v j ) labeling a node v j encodes the dependencies between v j and the exploits preparing for it. In the original attack graph, each exploit v j may require one or more security conditions to be satisfied, and each such condition may be achieved through several alternative exploits. This explains the conjunctive normal form of γ(v j ). For instance, in the example of Figure 3 , which is a compact representation of the attack graph of Figure 2 , γ(rsh(1, 2)) = ν(ftp rhosts(1, 2), rsh(1, 2))^(ν(rsh(0, 1), rsh(1, 2))_ ν(sshd bof (0, 1), rsh(1, 2))). In the following, we will often abuse notation, and use v i instead of ν i, j in condition γ(v j ) when v j is clear from the context. Additionally, we say that a set V * of exploits satisfies condition γ(v j ) if exploits in V * are sufficient to satisfy all the security conditions required by v i .
In our model, edges in the attack graph are labeled with timespan distributions. For instance, in the attack graph of Figure 6 , the edges from v C to v D and v F are labeled with f(3, 10), 0:7g and f(1, 9), 0:3g respectively, meaning that, after exploiting v C , with 70% probability an attacker will exploit v D between 3 and 10 time units later, and with 30% probability he will exploit v F between 1 and 9 time units later.
Attacks can be executed in many different ways, which we refer to as instances. The notion of attack instance is formalized in the following definition. Definition 6. Attack Instance. Given a probabilistic temporal attack graph A = (V , E, δ, γ), an instance of A is a tree T = (V T , E T ) over A, rooted at an end node of A and defined as follows:
*A time interval is a closed interval of the set T of all time points.
• jV T ∩ V e j = 1, i.e., there is exactly one end node of A in T;
An instance is represented as a tree because each attack pattern aims at creating a certain target condition (e.g., gaining access to the database server of Figure 3 ), which can be achieved by executing an exploit corresponding to an end node in the temporal attack graph (the root of the tree). Each exploit may require one or more exploits being executed in preparation for it, and the leaves of the tree represent exploits which depend on initial security conditions.
Dependency Graphs
As mentioned earlier, modern distributed systems typically consist of a large number of interdependent hardware and software components. Some dependencies may not even be explicit, and Leslie Lamport's famous quote ''a distributed system is one in which the failure of a computer you didn't even know existed can render your own computer unusable'' 26 greatly captures the essence of the problem. In the following, we will use the term network component, or simply component, to refer to any component of a distributed system at any level of abstraction (e.g., subnet, host, application, service). Dependencies amongst network entities can be broadly classified in the following three categories: redundancy (a network component depends on a redundant pool of resources), graceful degradation (a network component depends on a pool of other components such that, if one fails, the system can continue to work with degraded performance), and strict dependence (a component strictly depends on a pool of other components, such that, if one fails, the dependent component becomes unavailable). In order to model all possible scenarios, we first assume that the status of each network component can be represented as an availability indicator on a scale from 0 to 1, 1 meaning that the component is fully operational, and 0 meaning that it is unavailable. We then assume the existence of a family F of functions of the form f : ½0, 1 n → ½0, 1, which evaluate the availability of a component given the availability of the n components it depends on. We call these functions dependency functions, and require that f (0, . . . , 0) = 0 and f (1, . . . , 1) = 1.
The equations below define dependency functions corresponding to the three scenarios described above. If a dependency is described by f r , then h is fully operational if at least one of the components it depends on is fully operational. If the dependency is described by f d , h can continue to operate, with degraded availability, even when one or more of the components it relies upon are not fully operational. Finally, if the dependency is described by f s , all the components need to be fully operational for h to be fully operational.
Based on this preliminary analysis, Albanese et al.
24
introduced a generalization of dependency graphs that can capture not only which components depend on which other components, but also the nature of such dependencies. Service dependency models have been widely studied. Kheir et al. 27 propose a service dependency representation that enables intrusion and response impact evaluation. However, although it is possible to automatically discover dependencies 28 , the task of understanding the nature of Figure 6 . Probabilistic temporal attack graph corresponding to the vulnerability dependency graph of Figure 4 such dependencies has not been fully automated yet. For the purpose of the proposed framework, we will assume that dependency graphs generated via existing tools are manually augmented by system administrators. Further research will be needed to fully automate this process. • H is a set of nodes, corresponding to network components; • Q = f(h 1 , h 2 ) ∈ H × Hjh 1 depends on h 2 g is a set of edges; • φ : H → F is a mapping that associates with each node h ∈ H a function f ∈ F , s.t. the arity of f is equal to the outdegree of h y .
For each node h ∈ H, h . denotes the set of components that depend on h and _ h denotes the set of components h depends on. Figure 7 shows the dependency graph for the network of Figure 1 . This graph shows that the two services Online Shopping and Mobile Order Tracking rely upon hosts h A and h C respectively. In turn, host h A relies upon local database server h B and hosts h E and h F , whereas host h C relies upon local database server h D and host h F . Similarly, h B , h D , h E , and h F rely upon database server h G , which then appears to be the most critical resource. Both h E and h F strictly depend on h G . Local database servers also depend on h G , but they can continue to operate, with degraded availability, if h G is compromised.
Without loss of generality, we can assume an arbitrary but fixed time granularity, and use T to denote the set of all time points. We can now introduce the definition of network status function, which, for each time point t, maps a network component to its availability at time t. Definition 8. Network Status Function. Given a generalized dependency graph D = (H, Q, φ), a network status function for D is a function s : H × T → ½0, 1 such that 8h ∈ H and 8t ∈ T , s(h, t) ≤ f (s (h i 1 , t) , . . . , s(h i m , t)), where f = φ(h), and _h = fh i 1 , . . . , h i m g is the set of components h depends on.
The availability of a component h is bounded by its corresponding dependency function, which represents a theoretical maximum. In practice, the availability may be lower if h has been directly compromised by an attack.
Problem Statement
In this section, we motivate the need for integrating attack and dependency graphs into a multi-layer model for the purpose of accurately assessing the impact of ongoing attacks as well as the potential impact of future attacks. Throughout this section, we will continue to refer to the y If h is a terminal node in the dependency graph (i.e., it does not depend on any other node), we assume φ(h) is the constant (0-ary) function 1. Figure 1 network depicted in Figure 1 as a motivating example. As mentioned before, this network offers two public-facing services, namely Online Shopping and Mobile Order Tracking, and consists of three subnetworks separated by firewalls. The first two subnetworks implement the two services, and each of them includes a host accessible from the Internet. The third subnetwork implements the core business logic, and includes a central database server. An attacker who wants to exfiltrate sensitive data from the main database server will need to breach multiple firewalls and gain privileges on several hosts before reaching the target, as modeled via attack graphs. Figure 8 shows the complete probabilistic temporal attack graph for the network of Figure 1 . This graph shows that, once vulnerability v C on the Mobile Application Server (host h C ) has been exploited, we can expect the attacker to exploit either vulnerability v D on host h D or vulnerability v F on host h F . The probabilistic nature of this model enables us to understand which vulnerability is more likely to be exploited. However, the attack graph alone does not answer the following important questions: Which attack pattern will have the largest impact on the two services that the network provides? How can we mitigate the risk? Our model is designed to help security analysts answer these questions. In order to reach this objective, we need to understand how each attack step impacts the network and each individual service. As services and network components are often interdependent, we need to combine information gathered through service dependency analysis with the information available in the attack graph, so as to be able to map each exploit to the component that is affected by that exploit, and analyze how the compromise of that component propagates to other components that may rely on it.
In fact, although dependency and attack graphs are great tools to analyze raw security data and derive useful insights on the structure and weaknesses of a network, the following example clearly shows that neither of these tools, if used alone, can provide a cyber security analyst with enough information to make good decisions.
Example 2. Consider the graph of Figure 8 . After observing an exploit of vulnerability v C , an analyst could be inclined to prioritize remediation of v D over v F -if no additional information is available -as v D is the most likely vulnerability to be exploited after v C . However, as we show later in this section, when the actual impact is taken into consideration and quantified, remediating v D turns to be the least effective course of action. Figure 9 shows the dependency graph for our reference network, using a more compact representation than the one used in Figure 7 . Additionally, each node of the dependency graph has been augmented with an integer number Figure 1 representing the value of the corresponding asset. Intuitively, when looking at both graphs, it appears that exploiting v F , although less likely, may have a larger impact, as its compromise would propagate and have an impact on the availability of the other service (Online Shopping, h S ), which is still unaffected after the exploitation of v C . On the other hand, exploiting v D would not have an impact beyond the Mobile Order Tracking service (h T ), which was already rendered unavailable by the previous exploit.
In the next section, we define a metric for assessing the impact, and, by computing this metric, we show that our intuition with respect to the example above is confirmed. However, before presenting our impact assessment model in detail, we need to understand the context in which this model can be used. The ultimate goal is to develop the capability to identify critical attack paths and prioritize hardening actions. From a risk management perspective, we can think of critical attack paths as those paths that, once exploited, would result in an elevated impact on the organization's mission or delivery of services. The goal of the proposed impact analysis model is exactly that of identifying such critical paths and computing a numerical score that captures their potential impact. This information would then enable cyber security analysts to prioritize remediation actions using a mission-centric approach.
Remediation actions may consist in patching vulnerabilities, changing configuration settings, adding, upgrading or removing software, which in turn will render both attack and dependency graphs obsolete. Therefore, we envision a continuous cycle, as shown in Figure 10 , where the attack impact model defined in the following section is periodically updated or recomputed to reflect the consequences of both remediation actions taken in response to a previous assessment and any changes to the system due to various other reasons, including but not limited to new hardware and new functionality being deployed. Once the model has been updated, a new cycle of impact assessment will result in identifying a new set of high-impact attack paths, which in turn will drive the selection of new remediation actions, therefore starting a new iteration of the assessment cycle.
Impact Assessment Graph
By combining the information contained in the dependency and attack graphs in what we call the impact assessment graph, we can compute the impact of ongoing attacks and estimate the future impact that ongoing attacks might cause for each possible outcome of the current situation. In practice, the proposed model bridges the semantic gap between known vulnerabilities -the lowest abstraction level -and the missions or services that could be ultimately affected by the exploitation of such vulnerabilities -the highest abstraction level. The impact assessment graph for the network of Figure 1 is shown in Figure 11 . In this figure, the graph on the left is the attack graph modeling all the vulnerabilities in the system and their relationships, whereas the graph on the right is the dependency graph capturing all the explicit and implicit dependencies between services and hosts. The edges from nodes in the attack graph to nodes in the dependency graph indicate which services or hosts are directly impacted by a successful vulnerability exploit, and are labeled with the corresponding exposure factor, that is the percentage loss the affected asset would experience upon successful execution of the exploit.
The key observation behind our approach to combining attack and dependency graphs is that the execution of a vulnerability exploit (i.e., a node in the attack graph) might cause a more or less severe reduction in the availability of one or more network components (nodes in the dependency graph). This, in turn, may affect other components not directly affected by the exploit. We can thus introduce the following fundamental definition. Definition 9. Impact Assessment Graph. Given a probabilistic temporal attack graph A = (V , E, δ, γ) and a generalized dependency graph D = (H, Q, φ), an impact assessment graph is a 4-tuple (A, D, F, η) where
• η : F → ½0, 1 is a function that associates with each pair (v, h) ∈ F a real number in the ½0, 1 interval representing the percentage reduction in the availability of network component h caused by vulnerability exploit v. h
Intuitively, impact assessment graphs merge attack and dependency graphs introducing edges between vulnerability exploits and network components encoding how the latter are affected by the former. The numbers labeling these edges represent the percentage reduction in the We can use impact assessment graphs to track the evolution of an attack, monitor the status of the network, and assess damage at the same time. Without loss of generality, we assume that 8h ∈ H, s(h, t 0 ) = 1, i.e., every component of the network is fully available at time t 0 . In the following, we will abuse notation and use s i (h) to denote s(h, t i ). If exploit v has been executed at time t i , we can evaluate the status of the network at time t i as follows:
where f = φ(h), η(v, h) = 0 when (v, h) ∈ F, and -with a slight abuse of notation -f (
The status of the network needs to be updated every time a successful exploit is detected. However, given the structure of the dependency graph, we only need to update the status of components directly or indirectly affected by the exploit. In order to assess the impact, we assume that each network component h has a given theoretical utility u(h) (corresponding to the case when h is fully operational). We also assume that the actual utility at time t i is proportional to the availability of h at time t i and is given by u i (h) = s i (h) · u(h). We then estimate the marginal impact caused by an exploit at time t i as the loss of utility w.r.t. the situation at time t iÀ1 .
Example 3. Consider the impact assessment graph of Figure 11 . Suppose that 8h ∈ H, s 0 (h) = 1 and an attacker exploits vulnerability v C at time t 1 . This makes h C completely unavailable (as η(v C , h C ) = 1), leading to s 1 (h C ) = 0. As h T strictly depends on h C , we also have s 1 (h T ) = 0. Therefore, the marginal impact cause exploit v C is impact 1 = 14. At time t 2 , the attacker may take one of two possible steps: exploiting v D (with probability 0.7) or v F (with probability 0.3). In the first case, impact 2 = 0:7 · 5 = 3:5 (h C and h T are already unavailable because of the previous exploit). In the second case, impact 2 = 0:7 · 7 + 8 + 10 = 22:9 (h F is partially compromised, making h A and h S unavailable). In conclusion, the second alternative, although less likely, can result in a much larger impact.
This example confirms our intuition, and illustrates the benefits of combining the two classes of models.
Applications
As anticipated, the proposed model can be used to assess the impact of ongoing attacks as well as the impact of future attacks, where the term future attack may also refer Figure 11 . The impact assessment graph for the motivating example network to ways in which currently discovered intrusions may evolve in the future.
Impact of Current Attacks
Consider an impact assessment graph G = (A, D, F, η) , where A = (V , E, δ, γ) and D = (H, Q, φ) are a probabilistic temporal attack graph and a generalized dependency graph respectively. Assume that an attacker has exploited a sequence of vulnerabilities V 0 = hv i 1 , . . . , v i n i ∈ V n , such that 8j ∈ ½1, n v i j was exploited at time t j . Intuitively, the total impact of this multi-step attack is the cumulative impact resulting from the sequence of individual exploits. Therefore, after computing the marginal impact of each attack step as illustrated in the previous section, we can compute the impact of the multi-step attack as the sum of all these marginal impacts, that is:
Combining Equations 5 and 6, we obtain:
where 8h ∈ H, s 0 (h) = 1, that is all components are available at time t 0 .
Example 4. Consider the impact assessment graph of Figure 11 , and assume that an attacker has exploited the sequence of vulnerabilities V 0 = hv C , v D i. The total impact is then given by impact 0 = (1 · 7 + 1 · 7) + (0:7 · 5) = 17:5
Now, assume that the attacker has exploited instead the sequence of vulnerabilities V 00 = hv C , v F i. The total impact is then given by
This result further confirms our previous finding that the second attack path, although less likely, has a higher impact.
Impact of Future Attacks
Consider again an impact assessment graph G = (A, D, F, η), where A = (V , E, δ, γ) and D = (H, Q, φ) are a probabilistic temporal attack graph and a generalized dependency graph respectively. Assume that an attacker has exploited a sequence of vulnerabilities V 0 = hv i 1 , . . . , v i n i ∈ V n . Given two integers k, m ∈ N, we would like to find the k partial attack paths of length m starting from a successor of v i n and having the largest values of the proposed impact metric. In other words, v i n is the most recently exploited vulnerability, and we would like to identify, amongst all possible ways the attack could evolve in the next m steps, the attack paths with the highest impact.
Using a graph traversal algorithm -either depth-first or breadth-first -we can generate the set of all paths of length m originating at one of the successor nodes of v i n , that is the set V * = fv ∈ V j (v i n , v) ∈ Eg. The set of such paths can be defined as: P = fhv i n + 1 , . . . , v i n + m ij8j ∈ ½1, m, (v i n + jÀ1 , v i n + j ) ∈ Eg
The total impact of each path p l ∈ P can then be computed as the sum of the marginal impacts resulting from each individual attack step in p l , that is:
Once the impact has been computed for all possible paths in P, identifying the top k paths with respect to impact is straightforward.
Example 5. Consider again the impact assessment graph of Figure 11 . Suppose that the attacker has exploited the sequence of vulnerabilities V 0 = hv C i, including a single vulnerability. Using a graph traversal algorithm, we can generate the set of all paths of length m originating at one of the successor nodes of v C , that is the set V * = fv D , v F g. Assuming m = 1, the set of such paths is simply P = fhv D i, hv F ig. The impact of path p 1 = hv D i can be computed as impact 1 = 0:7 · 5 = 3:5, as shown in example 3. Similarly, the impact of path p 2 = hv F i can be computed as impact 2 = 0:7 · 7 + 8 + 10 = 22:9. This result confirms that, if we want to minimize the impact of 1-step attacks following an exploit of v C , we need to remediate vulnerability v F . However, if we assume assume m = 2, the set of paths is P = fhv D , v G i, hv F , v G ig, and it is easy to show that they have the same impact in that they both compromise node v G , which is a single point of failure for this system.
When k is sufficiently small, exhaustively computing the set P of all paths of length m is feasible. However, for larger values of k, we need to pair the graph traversal algorithm with a heuristic pruning strategy to limit the search space. For instance, at each step of the algorithm we could maintain only a limited number of partial paths, such number being either k or c · k, where c is a small integer.
Finally, the set of top k critical paths could be presented to a cyber analyst for further inspection, or it could be used to drive automatic vulnerability remediation.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have looked at how complex interdependencies amongst the numerous and diverse components of today's networked systems may enable an attacker to wage sophisticated and high-impact multi-step attacks against corporate and government networks. As research has shown, explicit and implicit interdependencies exist at various layers of the hardware and software architecture. In particular, dependencies between vulnerabilities and dependencies between applications and services are critical for assessing the impact of multi-step attacks. These two classes of interdependencies have been traditionally studied using attack and dependency graphs respectively. Although significant work has been done in the area of both attack and dependency graphs, we have shown that neither of these models can provide an accurate assessment of an attack's impact, when used in isolation. To address this limitation, we have presented a solution that integrates these two powerful models into a unified model, which enables us to assess the true impact of multi-step attacks and generate effective hardening recommendations.
